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Abstract. This paper is a systematic exploration of non-wellfounded mereology. Motivations
and applications suggested in the literature are considered. Some are exotic like Borges’ ALEPH, and
the TRINITY; other examples are less so, like TIME TRAVELING BRICKS, and even Geach’s TIBBLES
THE CAT. The authors point out that the transitivity of non-wellfounded parthood is inconsistent with
extensionality. A non-wellfounded mereology is developed with careful consideration paid to rival
notions of supplementation and fusion. Two equivalent axiomatizations are given, and are compared
to classical mereology. We provide a class of models with respect to which the non-wellfounded
mereology is sound and complete.
This paper explores the prospects of non-wellfounded mereology. An order < (in this
case proper parthood) on a domain is said to be wellfounded if every nonempty subset
of that domain has a <-minimal element. We say that x is a <-minimal element of a
set S if there is no y in S such that y < x . Wellfoundedness rules out any infinite
descending <-chains. There are atomless mereologies, sometimes called gunky, in which
proper parthood chains are all infinite.1 This is one interesting and important case of a non-
wellfounded mereology. But notice, wellfoundedness also rules out structures in which for
some x , x < x ; likewise, it rules out cases in which there is some x and y such that x < y
and y < x . That is, wellfoundedness rules out parthood loops. In this paper, we explore a
non-wellfounded mereology that allows for both these sorts of parthood loops.
In §1, we briefly survey some applications for non-wellfounded mereology that have
been suggested in the literature. In §2, we consider difficulties with the classical definitions
of parthood and proper parthood; we discuss extensionality principles in mereology, and
argue that extensionality is inconsistent with the transitivity of parthood in certain non-
wellfounded scenarios. In §3, we examine supplementation principles and rival notions
of fusion for non-wellfounded mereology. §4 examines the relationship between classical
mereology and non-wellfounded mereology. We show that the latter is a simple generaliza-
tion of the former. Finally, we give a class of models for which non-wellfounded mereology
is sound and complete in §5.
§1. Why? Why would one consider a mereology according to which there could be
proper parthood loops? After all, there appears to be a consensus that it is a conceptual
truth that parthood is a partial order. Simons (1987) writes,
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1 See Tarski (1956) for one formalization. Some philosophers have argued that gunk is
metaphysically possible, for example, Sider (1993) and Zimmerman (1996).
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The most obvious formal properties of the [proper] part-relation are its
transitivity and asymmetry, from which follows its irreflexivity. [. . . ]
These principles are partly constitutive of the meaning of ‘part’, which
means that anyone who seriously disagrees with them has failed to un-
derstand the word. (10–11)
Simons’ view has been influential; however, there have been dissenters. In this section,
we will briefly survey some cases purported to be examples of non-wellfounded objects.
1.1. Exotica. We begin with some of the more exotic cases. Sanford (1993) contends
that the naı¨ve notion of parthood does not require antisymmetry. Sanford cites Borges’
‘Aleph’ as an example: “I saw the Aleph from all points. I saw the earth in the Aleph
and in the earth the Aleph once more and the earth in the Aleph [. . . ].” As Sandford
notes, the Aleph is intended to have everything as a part, including the earth. But ap-
parently the Aleph is a proper part of the earth, given the fact that it is sitting on the
stairs in Beatriz Viterbo’s house. van Inwagen (1993) has responded that fictional ex-
amples of this sort do not constitute counterevidence to conceptual truths. While Borges
may have been knowingly and intentionally writing fiction, other authors have given ex-
amples in texts that were not intended as fiction. These examples, however, are no less
bizarre.
Strikingly similar to Borges’ example, is an interesting passage in the Upanishads
(Mascaro´, 1965) that outlines the structural relations between Brahman and a ‘space’ in
the heart.
In the center of the castle of Brahman, our own body, there is a small
shrine in the form of a lotus-flower, and within can be found a small
space. [. . . ] This little space within the heart is as great as this vast
universe. The heavens and earth are there, and the sun, and the moon,
and the stars; fire and lightning and winds are there; and all that now is
and all that is not; for the whole universe is in Him and He dwells within
our heart. (120)
Of course, many philosophers would regard such a structure as metaphysically impossi-
ble, but it seems an additional question as to whether it is conceptually impossible.
Again, consider another traditional religious doctrine: the Trinity. Abelard (2006) argues
that while each person of the Trinity is a part of God, each person of the Trinity is also
identical with God, by virtue of having the same essence. Is the Trinity on Abelard’s
understanding conceptually impossible? Perhaps, but this is not obvious. In any case,
given the extraordinary nature of the purported counterexamples, we do not expect many
to be convinced. So let us turn now to less exotic, more ordinary examples of parthood
loops.
1.2. Puzzles of composition. A standard puzzle of composition concerns a lump of
clay that is formed into a statue. One might think it plausible that, although the lump and
the statue are not identical, they are completely colocated and ‘made up of’ exactly the
same matter. It is thus highly intuitive to think that they have exactly the same atomic
parts. However given a standard mereological ‘supplementation’ principle, that anything
the statue is not a part of is disjoint from some part of the statue, one can infer that the
statue is a part of the lump of clay; and by symmetrical reasoning that the lump of clay
is a part of the statue. Thus the clay and the statue are parts of each other. But since we
are supposing that they are not identical, they must be distinct mutual proper parts. In fact,
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philosophers have defended similar positions.2 Judith Thomson suggests that the statue is
constituted by the clay, and that constitution requires mutual parthood: “x constitutes y at t
only if x is part of y at t and y is part of x at t” (Thomson, 1998, p. 155). But constitution,
Thomson thinks, does not imply identity.3
Another classical puzzle of composition concerns Tibbles the cat.4 Tibbles is a cat who
has a tail at some time t1 and loses it at t2. Call Tibbles’ tail ‘Tail’; and call the part of
Tibbles without his tail ‘Tib’.
Tib is smaller than Tibbles so they are not identical. But what if we now
amputate the cat’s tail? Tibbles and Tib will now coincide. If Tibbles is
still a cat, it is hard to see by what criterion one could deny that Tib is a
cat. [. . . ] But there is just one cat on the mat. So [Tibbles and Tib] cannot
be distinct cats. They must be the same cat. (Noonan, 2009)
The literature is filled with many different responses to this puzzle.5 Given that Tibbles
and Tib have the same proper parts after the amputation it is very natural to infer that they
are mutual parts.6 Tib might be a proper part of Tibbles before the amputation, but Tibbles
and Tib are mutual parts afterwards.
If a non-wellfounded mereology was formally viable, then there are other unexplored
responses. One could hold that Tib is a proper part of Tibbles and also that Tib is identical
to Tibbles even before amputation. Indeed, Abelard (2006) appeared to have held such a
view.7
[W]hen a hand has been cut off, that which then stays a human was also
staying a human before the amputation, although it was hidden as a part
in the human who was the whole. [. . . ] Therefore, although before all
amputations there were many parts in one human each of which was
human, still there were not for this reason many humans. [. . . ] For the
humans here have the same essence. (302)
There may be drawbacks to such approaches; however, these considerations should be
weighed against the drawbacks of competing theories.8
1.3. Mereology & time travel. There is a growing literature surrounding the topic of
mereology and time travel.9 Time travel scenarios have been proposed as counterexamples
to certain mereological principles, many of which imply that proper parthood is non-
wellfounded.
2 See Cotnoir (2010) for a wellfounded explanation of mutual parthood.
3 See Thomson (1983, p. 208 and p. 219, footnote 12).
4 Originally due to Geach (1962); see also Wiggins (1968).
5 For a good selection, see Rea’s (1997) collection.
6 Here one must also appeal to the principle ‘Strong Supplementation’—see NWS4 in §3.
7 This view is exactly analogous to his views on the Trinity; indeed, his views on both occur in the
same passage.
8 For example, see Eagle (2010), (especially §3), for suggestions of general ways in which the
apparently distinguishing characteristics of Tib and Tibbles may be explained away.
9 At the time of writing, the literature includes Gilmore’s (2007) argument against perdurantism,
Eagle’s (2010) response, and Gilmore’s (2010) reply. Independently, Effingham & Robson (2007)
have used similar cases to argue against endurantism, Smith’s (2009) response, and Effingham’s
(2010) reply.
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For instance, consider Effingham (2010):
Imagine a cube, with each side measuring 10m, made of a homogeneous
substance. Not only do we take it back to a time that it previously existed
at, but we use a shrinking machine and miniaturize by a factor of 100. We
then remove a cube-shaped portion, with edges measuring 10cm, from
the earlier, larger version of the cube and replace that portion with the
miniaturized future version (which now fits perfectly). The cube is now
a proper part of itself at that time.
Although it is not obvious how such uses of ‘proper part’ are to be interpreted (as will be
discussed in §2), if such time travel stories are to be accepted as legitimate metaphysical
possibilities, then one would assume a non-wellfounded mereology is required to model
them.
1.4. Other examples. There are other examples of non-wellfounded relations bearing
similarities to the parthood relation in the literature. For instance, Kearns (2011) argues
that Russellian propositions have mereological parts and that such a mereology must thus
be non-wellfounded to account for propositions like the following:
P is abstract.
Here P is the proposition expressed by the above sentence (assuming a proposition is
expressed). Indeed, the existence of such propositions is a central component to the solution
of the liar paradox defended by Barwise & Etchemendy (1987). It should be noted that this
potential application appears to rely on a presupposed relationship between the constituents
of a proposition and the parts of a proposition. We have reservations about the similarities
between these notions, and so are unsure that the non-wellfounded mereology advanced
below has application here.10
Another example can be drawn from the metaphysics of sets. Lewis (1991) has ar-
gued that sets themselves may have nontrivial mereological properties. Although not the
Lewisian view, if a set’s members are among its parts, then one must countenance a non-
wellfounded mereology to account for the mereological properties of non-wellfounded
sets. Varzi (2006) suggests this application, and concludes,
In view of certain developments in non-wellfounded set theory [. . . ],
one might indeed suggest building mereology on the basis of an equally
less restrictive notion of parthood that allows for closed loops. This is
particularly significant in view of the possibility of reformulating set
theory itself in mereological terms [. . . ]. Thus, in this case there is le-
gitimate concern that one of the obvious meaning postulates for ‘part’ is
in fact too restrictive. At present, however, no systematic study of non-
wellfounded mereology has been put forward in the literature.
The relationship between set membership and parthood Varzi is suggesting is contro-
versial. However, before we can even begin a systematic investigation of these issues we
need to develop a theory of parthood that allows for non-wellfoundedness. But given that
10 In fact, the authors have conflicting opinions. One of us (Bacon) believes the relation that holds
between a Russellian proposition and its constituents is not parthood, and hence rejects that the
application can be made. The other (Cotnoir) has no settled view, and leaves the possibility of
application open.
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no study of non-wellfounded mereology has been undertaken, this paper is an attempt to
fill that gap. So, we move from potential applications of the theory to the theory itself.
§2. Primitives and definitions. What we want, then, is a mereology of objects that
may be proper parts of each other, and objects that may be proper parts of themselves.
According to classical mereology, parthood is taken to be primitive and is a partial order.
MA1 Reflexivity: x ≤ x
MA2 Antisymmetry: (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)→ x = y
MA3 Transitivity: (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z)→ x ≤ z
We then go on to define proper parthood in one of two ways:
PP1 x < y := (x ≤ y) ∧ (x %= y)
PP2 x < y := (x ≤ y) ∧ (y ! x).
These axioms ensure that proper parthood does not allow for proper parthood loops. More
specifically, assuming MA2, PP1 and PP2 are equivalent. But PP1 rules out any cases
where x < x . And PP2 rules out any cases where x < y and y < x . In effect, proper
parthood is a strict order, with no parthood loops.
One option is simply to reject the antisymmetry axiom (MA2), and stipulate that part-
hood is merely a preorder.11 So, PP1 and PP2 are no longer logically equivalent. In fact,
in the absence of antisymmetry, it is consistent with PP1 for there to be cases where x < y
and y < x . However, PP1 still rules out cases where x < x by definition. The relation
defined by PP1 is thus nontransitive. On the other hand, PP2 rules out both cases where
x < x and cases where x < y and y < x . If we want to model both cases, we need different
axioms and definitions.
One easy way to construct a non-wellfounded mereology of the desired sort would be to
start with a primitive proper parthood relation < and require only that it be transitive.
NWA1 Transitivity: (x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z.
NWA1 allows for proper parthood loops in both of the desired ways: we will have cases
where x < x and cases where x < y while y < x . We can then introduce definitions of
overlap and parthood in the usual fashion
P x ≤ y := x < y ∨ x = y
O x ◦ y := ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y)
Parthood according to P is reflexive. Moreover, ≤ inherits transitivity from the transitivity
of < and =. However, we shall see that ≤ is not in general antisymmetric.
One might wonder what conditions suffice for two composite objects to be identical.
Here are some natural candidates:
x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x
∀z(z < x ↔ z < y)
∀z(z ◦ x ↔ z ◦ y)
In classical mereology, each of these conditions suffice for the identity of x and y. These
conditions correspond to three so-called extensionality principles.
11 This is the strategy employed in Cotnoir (2010).
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EP Extensionality of Parts: (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)→ x = y
EPP Extensionality of Proper Parts: (Co(x)∨Co(y))→ (∀z(z < x ↔ z < y)→ x = y)
EO Extensionality of Overlap: ∀z(z ◦ x ↔ z ◦ y)→ x = y
Notice that EP is just the antisymmetry principle (MA2). In EPP, we say an object x is
composite if it has a proper part; this is expressed via a predicate Co(x) := ∃y(y < x).
The reason we require that EPP be restricted only to composite objects is to allow for more
than one atom.12 In EO, it is claimed that any two objects with the same overlappers are
identical.
Given the transitivity of < and the presence of distinct mutual parts, we cannot consis-
tently have any of the above extensionality principles. For EP, consider two distinct but
mutual proper parts a and b. Since a < b, b < a, and a %= b, we have a ≤ b and b ≤ a
without a and b being identical. Thus ≤ is not antisymmetric; EP fails. For EPP and EO,
consider a and b again. By transitivity (NWA1), we have a < a and b < b. Moreover,
transitivity guarantees that any proper part of a is a proper part of b, and vice versa.
a b
• • •
This means that no matter what proper parts a and b have, mutual parthood and transitivity
force every part of one to be part of the other. But since a and b have proper parts, they
are not atoms; hence, by EPP, a = b. But this contradicts our supposition that a %= b. By
similar reasoning one can see that a and b have the same overlappers. If we had EO, we
could once again infer that a = b, contradicting the supposition that a and b are distinct
but mutual parts. In effect, transitivity plus extensionality rules out parthood loops.
§3. Axioms for non-wellfounded mereology. In this section, we will explore vari-
ous supplementation principles and fusion principles for non-wellfounded mereology. We
argue that fusions are best understood in one of two ways depending on which supplemen-
tation axiom is accepted. In neither case are fusions unique.
3.1. Decomposition. Supplementation principles in mereology are designed to satisfy
the intuition that if an object has one proper part, it must have another. Simons (1987)
considers a number of such principles, as does Varzi (2006); so, we will follow their lead.
First, consider the straightforward intuition:
NWS1 Weak Company: x < y → ∃z(z < y ∧ z %= x).
NWS1 states that if an object has a proper part, then it has another distinct proper part.
This supplementation principle, of course rules out any object a such that a < a and a has
no other proper parts.
a
But this is arguably the most basic case of a non-wellfounded object (sometimes called a
‘Quine atom’).13 And so NWS1 will not do.
12 The same restriction is required on the extensionality principle in set theory with urelements.
13 This name is presumably from the characterization of ‘individuals’ in Quine’s (1980) New
Foundations.
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Consider another candidate supplementation principle.
NWS2 Strong Company: x < y → ∃z(z < y ∧ z ! x).
Of course, NWS2 is strictly stronger than NWS1, and so inherits all its problems (such as
ruling out the Quine atom.) But it is worth seeing that NWS2 rules out all cases of mutual
parthood. For if a < b and b < a, then by transitivity, we have it that a < a and b < b.
Moreover, any z that is part of a will be part of b, and vice versa. But then there can be no
part of a that is not a part of b; there can be no witness for z in NWS2. Thus all models
like the one below are ruled out.
a b
z
But this, like extensionality, ruins the whole motive for non-wellfounded parthood.
Most mereologists have accepted the next principle;14 some have gone so far as to claim
that it is constitutive of the concept of parthood.15
NWS3 Weak Supplementation: x < y → ∃z(z ≤ y ∧ ¬z ◦ x).
But NWS3 is also inconsistent with any proper parthood relation that is not irreflexive and
asymmetric. Unlike NWS1, NWS3 rules out any reflexive proper parthood structure at all,
even if that object has other proper parts. Assume a < a. Assume also that there are b and
c s.t. b < a and c < a.
a
b c
There is still no z ≤ a such that ¬z ◦ a, simply by definition.
There is, however, a principle which is seemingly stronger than NWS3 which is consis-
tent with non-wellfoundedness in this setting.
NWS4 Strong Supplementation: y ! x → ∃z(z ≤ y ∧ ¬z ◦ x).
Given MA1–MA3 and PP1 or PP2, NWS4 implies NWS3. However, that proof relies on
the antisymmetry of ≤, which fails here. Notice, the antecedent in the supplementation
principle is y ! x , which implies that y ≮ x and y %= x . This is actually a weaker constraint
than x < y, the antecedent in NWS1–NWS3. NWS4 does not rule out all reflexive parts,
nor does it rule out all mutual parthood structures. It does, however, rule out certain models,
like the following.
a
b
In this case, we have a reflexive part a with only one other proper part b. But a ! b
and there is no part of a that does not overlap b. If the above model included c < a but
14 For some rare exceptions, see Forrest (2002) and Smith (2009).
15 See Simons (1987) and Varzi (2009).
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c ≮ b and b ≮ c (viz. the countermodel to NWS3), it would be a model of NWS4. In fact,
this principle does seem to restrict our models to the sorts we would like, by requiring a
‘remainder’.
In in the presence of antisymmetry, NWS4 implies the extensionality of overlap (EO)
and proper parthood (EPP).16 However, as we shall see in §4.2, in the non-wellfounded
setting NWS4 does not imply any extensionality principles. The following nonextensional
model satisfies NWS4.
a b
c d
Because NWS4 captures the ‘remainder’ intuition while still being consistent with non-
wellfounded objects like Quine atoms and mutual proper parts, there is good prima facie
reason to accept it as an axiom. It may seem a bit surprising that the axiom that guarantees
extensionality in the classical setting is consistent with nonextensional non-wellfounded
mereology. However, that guarantee relies crucially on the antisymmetry of ≤, which
fails here.
There is another candidate for supplementation that is worth considering.
NWS5 Complementation: y ! x → ∃z∀w(w ≤ z ↔ (w ≤ y ∧ ¬w ◦ x)).
This principle is a lot like NWS4, with the exception that instead of stipulating the exis-
tence of some non-x-overlapping remainder of y, it stipulates the existence of a remainder
of y that consists of (or is composed of) all and only the parts of y disjoint from x . Built in
to NWS5 is a principle regarding composition. Consider the following example:
a b
z?
c d e
In this case, a and b are mutual parts who share c, d, e as proper parts. The question here
is this: must c and e have an upper bound z which does not have d as a part? NWS4
does not require this, while NWS5 does. If there is no such z, then this model is ruled
out by complementation. Varzi (2006) rightly suggests that NWS5 bleeds into principles
regarding composition:
As it turns out, the extra strength of [NWS5] is therefore best appreciated
in terms of the sort of mereological aggregates that this principle would
force us to accept, aggregates that are composed of two or more parts of a
given whole. This suggests that any additional misgivings about [NWS5]
[. . . ] are truly misgivings about matters of composition.
Thus, we will withhold judgment on NWS5 until we examine various fusion axioms.
16 Strong supplementation is generally thought to be responsible for extensionality principles in
mereology. See Simons (1987, pp. 28–29), and Casati & Varzi (1999, p. 40).
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3.2. Composition. What sort of fusions are appropriate to a non-wellfounded mereol-
ogy? We begin with three candidate definitions of fusion. Here, we say that t is a fusion of
the ϕ’s, where ϕ is any predicate without t free and t is a term.17
F1 Fu1(t,ϕ) := ∀y(y ◦ t ↔ ∃x(ϕ ∧ y ◦ x))
F2 Fu2(t,ϕ) := ∀x(ϕ → x ≤ t) ∧ ∀y(y ≤ t → ∃x(ϕ ∧ y ◦ x))
F3 Fu3(t,ϕ) := ∀x(ϕ → x ≤ t) ∧ ∀y∀x((ϕ → x ≤ y)→ t ≤ y)
F1 says that t is the fusion of the ϕs when t overlaps exactly those things that overlap a ϕ.
F2 says that t is the fusion of the ϕs when any ϕ is part of t and any part of t overlaps some
ϕ. F3 says that t is the fusion of the ϕs when t has all the ϕs as parts and t is part of any
other y that has all the ϕs as parts. NWF3 is usually thought of as defining the notion of
a least upper bound. However, since we do not have the antisymmetry of ≤, it really only
expresses the notion of minimal upper bounds.18
Corresponding to each type of fusion, there are axiom schemes which assert the exis-
tence of each type of fusion for every formula ϕ without z free.
NWE1 ∃xϕ → ∃zFu1(z,ϕ)
NWE2 ∃xϕ → ∃zFu2(z,ϕ)
NWE3 ∃xϕ → ∃zFu3(z,ϕ)
All three definitions of fusion (NWF1–NWF3) are equivalent in the context of any axiom-
atization that yields classical mereology. Which fusion existence axiom (NWE1–NWE3)
yields classical mereology depends on the choice of other axioms. In nonclassical mere-
ologies, the definitions of fusion are often not equivalent. In the presence of transitivity
(NWA1) only, we can prove that ∀z(Fu2(z,ϕ) → Fu1(z,ϕ)), but not vice versa. So, in
one way, NWE2 is stronger than NWE1. The following model validates NWA1 and NWE1
but not NWE2:
a b
c d
Do a and b have a fusion? It might appear not. There is no object ‘made up’ of a and b
together. However, it turns out that a is a fusion (in the sense defined by Fu1) of a and b.
Let the extension of ϕ here be just a and b. Note that every object overlaps a if and only if
it overlaps b. Hence, every object overlaps a if and only if there’s some ϕ that it overlaps.
Moreover, b is also a fusion1 of a and b.19 On the other hand, a and b do not have a fusion2
in this model since there is nothing of which both a and b are a part, preventing the first
conjunct of NWF2 being satisfied.
It should be noted, however, that in the presence of strong supplementation (NWS4)
and transitivity (NWA1) these two notions of fusion are equivalent. Firstly, we note that
the principle ∀z(z ◦ y → z ◦ x) → y ≤ x is a straightforward consequence of NWS4.
Suppose, now, that x is a fusion1 of the ϕs so that (*): ∀y(x◦y ↔ ∃z(ϕ(z)∧z◦y)). We then
17 These definitions of fusions largely follow those discussed in Hovda (2009), where there he
calls them ‘Type-1’, ‘Type-2’, and ‘Mub’, respectively. They also correspond to the definitions
of fusion in Varzi (2006), where he calls their corresponding existence axioms ‘Strong Sum’,
‘Strong Sumb’, and ‘Strong Suma’, respectively.
18 See Hovda (2009, §1.3.1).
19 This point was first made in Hovda (2009).
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want to show x is a fusion2 of the ϕs—that is, we want to show (1) that ∀y(ϕ(y)→ y ≤ x)
and (2) that y ≤ x → ∃z(ϕ(z) ∧ z ◦ y). (2) is immediate from (*). For (1) suppose that
ϕ(y) and let z ◦ y. Since z overlaps a ϕ it follows, by (*), that z overlaps x, z ◦ x . By the
principle ∀z(z ◦ y → z ◦ x)→ y ≤ x , we have shown that y ≤ x as required for (1).
Consider also the model ruled out by complementation NWS5:
a b
c d e
According to Fu2, neither a nor b count as a fusion of c and e. And this model will be
ruled out by NWE2, since there is no fusion for c and e. Intuitively, it does seem as though
the model is missing something. It appears that you can simply fuse together c and e to get
all of a (or b for that matter) including d , even though neither c nor e overlap with d . And
that seems to be problematic with our intuitive notion of mereological sum.
This is precisely the reason that minimal upper bounds, as defined by Fu3, are problem-
atic.20 For according to Fu3, a (and for that matter b) does count as a fusion of c and e,
even though a has a completely unrelated part, d. There are some who are attracted to this
notion of fusion.21 However, Varzi (2009) argues against such a notion of fusion:
All this is hard to swallow. No matter how exactly one defines the word,
surely a fusion is supposed to be entirely composed of the things it fuses.
We think that Varzi is right, but that this criticism only applies in contexts where com-
plementation (NWS5) fails. Recall that the complementation axiom rules out such models
and requires the existence of an upper bound of c and e that does not have d as a part. So,
there is reason to think that NWE3 is an adequate fusion axiom scheme only when paired
with NWS5.
As mentioned above, Fu3 is usually associated with least upper bounds, a standard
algebraic notion of fusion. However, without antisymmetry, we do not have least upper
bounds because we do not, in general, have the uniqueness of fusions. In fact, on neither
F1, F2, nor F3 do we have the uniqueness of fusions.
UF1 (Fu1(x,ϕ) ∧ Fu1(y,ϕ))→ (x = y)
UF2 (Fu2(x,ϕ) ∧ Fu2(y,ϕ))→ (x = y)
UF3 (Fu3(x,ϕ) ∧ Fu3(y,ϕ))→ (x = y)
For example, consider the pair of mutual parts a and b, neither of which have any other
proper parts.
a b
Let the extension of ϕ be {a, b}. Then for each i = 1, 2, 3 we have both Fui (a,ϕ) and
Fui (b,ϕ). Adding further elements to the model containing a and b as parts would only in-
troduce more fusions if anything. It seems clear that in the presence of non-wellfoundedness
like that above none of the fusions considered can be unique.
20 See Varzi (2009).
21 See Hovda (2009), Sharvey (1983), and Link (1983).
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So, there are two options that best axiomatize non-wellfounded mereology.
P x ≤ y := x < y ∨ x = y
O x ◦ y := ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y)
F1 Fu1(t,ϕ) := ∀y(y ◦ t ↔ ∃x(ϕ ∧ y ◦ x))
NWA1 (x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z
NWS4 y ! x → ∃z(z ≤ y ∧ ¬z ◦ x)
NWE1 ∃xϕ → ∃zFu1(z,ϕ)
NWA1 + NWS4 + NWE1 is an axiomatization of non-wellfounded mereology. Note that
in the presence of strong supplementation the notions of a fusion1 and a fusion2 amount to
the same thing, so NWE2 is derivable in this system. Alternatively:
P x ≤ y := x < y ∨ x = y
O x ◦ y := ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y)
F3 Fu3(t,ϕ) := ∀x(ϕ → x ≤ t) ∧ ∀y(∀x(ϕ → x ≤ y)→ t ≤ y)
NWA1 (x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z
NWS5 y ! x → ∃z∀w(w ≤ z ↔ (w ≤ y ∧ ¬w ◦ x))
NWE3 ∃xϕ → ∃zFu3(z,ϕ)
NWA1 + NWS5 + NWE3 is an axiomatization of non-wellfounded mereology;22 in fact,
the two axiomatizations result in the same non-wellfounded mereology.23
§4. Classical and non-wellfounded mereology. We now turn to a comparison be-
tween classical and non-wellfounded mereology. Given the failure of many of the classical
supplementation, extensionality, and fusion uniqueness principles one might be led into
thinking that there is little if any parallel to be drawn between the system we discussed in
the previous section and classical extensional mereology. In §4.1, we show the connection
is quite simple: one needs only to drop the asymmetry of proper parthood from a standard
axiomatization of classical mereology. In §4.2, we examine exactly how much extension-
ality non-wellfounded mereology contains.
4.1. Classical mereology. Classical mereology is usually axiomatized with a primitive
improper parthood relation. Perhaps the most common axiomatization has ≤ as a partial
order, strong supplementation, and the existence of fusion1s, all stated using the primitive
≤ and with overlap defined by O.
MA1 x ≤ x
MA2 (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)→ x = y
MA3 (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z)→ x ≤ z
NWS4 y %≤ x → ∃z(z ≤ y ∧ ¬z ◦ x)
NWE1 ∃zϕ → ∃x∀y(x ◦ y ↔ ∃z(ϕ ∧ y ◦ z))
With only a minor change we can formulate classical mereology with a primitive proper
parthood relation instead:
NWA1 (x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z
NWA2 x < y → y ≮ x
22 Relatedly, see the wellfounded but nonextensional mereology axiomatized in Cotnoir (2010); it
has identical axioms but a different primitive and altered definitions.
23 Thanks to Paul Hovda for discussion.
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NWS4 y %≤ x → ∃z(z ≤ y ∧ ¬z ◦ x)
NWE1 ∃zϕ → ∃x∀y(x ◦ y ↔ ∃z(ϕ ∧ y ◦ z))
Here again≤ and ◦ are defined according to P and O. NWA1 and NWA2 are the axioms for
a strict partial order and and MA1–MA3 are axioms for a weak partial order. Other than
that, the systems are identical modulo definitions. It is well-known that every strict partial
order determines a weak partial order and vice versa. So, NWA1 + NWA2 + NWS4 +
NWE1 is equivalent to classical mereology.
The only principle that obviously rules out non-wellfoundedness is the asymmetry prin-
ciple NWA2. NWA2 obviously rules out cases of mutual parthood between distinct objects.
But it also rules out cases of self-parthood (e.g., the Quine atom), since an instance of
NWA2 is a < a → a ≮ a, and therefore a ≮ a. Dropping NWA2 leaves us with precisely
the non-wellfounded mereology discussed in §3.
4.2. Extensionality. Recall that one of the primary points of contrast between classical
and non-wellfounded mereology is that one does not seem to have any form of exten-
sionality in non-wellfounded mereology. In particular, one cannot maintain the following
extensionality principles:
EP (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)→ x = y
EO ∀z(z ◦ x ↔ z ◦ y)→ x = y
EPP (Co(x) ∨ Co(y))→ (∀z(z < x ↔ z < y)→ x = y)
The failure of antisymmetry (EP) is hardly surprising. Indeed, one promising applica-
tion of non-wellfounded mereology is to model exactly the kind of phenomena that EO
rules out. For example, the paradoxes of material constitution have lead people to re-
ject EO and EPP on independent grounds.24 It is perhaps surprising, however, that the
other cases of non-wellfoundedness discussed in §1 would require giving up EO and EPP
as well.
On the other hand, it can be seen that all the failures of extensionality stem from failures
of EP.25 Indeed, classical extensional mereology can prove the following extensionality
principles without the use of NWA2:
EO* ∀z(z ◦ x ↔ z ◦ y)→ (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)
EPP* (Co(x) ∨ Co(y))→ (∀z(z < x ↔ z < y)→ (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x))
According to these weakened extensionality principles, any two (composite) objects with
the same overlappers or proper parts are mutual improper parts. Then, in classical mereol-
ogy, we reason by antisymmetry (EP) to conclude that any such objects are identical. It is
only this last step that is not allowed in non-wellfounded mereology.
Similarly we may also obtain weakened versions of fusion uniqueness:
UF1* (Fu1(x,ϕ) ∧ Fu1(y,ϕ))→ (y ≤ x ∧ x ≤ y)
UF2* (Fu2(x,ϕ) ∧ Fu2(y,ϕ))→ (y ≤ x ∧ x ≤ y)
UF3* (Fu3(x,ϕ) ∧ Fu3(y,ϕ))→ (y ≤ x ∧ x ≤ y)
As before we may prove each of UF1*–UF3* in classical extensional mereology without
the use of NWA2. It is only because we cannot infer identity from mutual parthood that we
cannot get the full strength of uniqueness.
24 See for example, Hawthorne (2006), and papers in Rea (1997).
25 See also Cotnoir (2010) for further discussion of the connection between antisymmetry and
extensionality.
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§5. Models. The aim of this section is to describe a class of models for non-wellfounded
mereology. The analogous class in the case of classical extensional mereology is the class
of complete Boolean algebras without a least element. We show that a version of the
mereology in §3 in second-order logic is sound and complete, relative to full second-
order consequence, with respect to these models. In this section, we proceed in a more
streamlined fashion; some familiarity with lattice theory and Boolean algebras is assumed
in what follows.
It should be noted that even the classical extensional mereology discussed in §4.1 has
unintended models. Since it is a first-order theory with infinite models, it has a countably
infinite model. However there are no countably infinite complete Boolean algebras, and
thus no countably infinite complete Boolean algebras without a least element. It is natural,
then, to work in this context with a second-order fusion axiom:
SO-NWE1 ∀F(∃x Fx → ∃x∀y(x ◦ y ↔ ∃z(Fz ∧ y ◦ z)))
In order to make the comparison with classical extensional mereology we shall look first
at its models.
DEFINITION 5.1 Let X be a nonempty set of subsets of Y , X ⊆ P(Y ). X is a field of sets
iff X is closed under complements in Y and finite intersections. A partial order 〈B,≤〉 is a
Boolean algebra iff it is order isomorphic to a field of sets; that is, there is some bijection,
σ : B → X with x ≤ y iff σ (x) ⊆ σ (y) for each x, y ∈ B. 〈B,≤〉 is said to be complete
iff every subset of B has a supremum.
From our definition it follows that ∅ ∈ X for every field of sets X ⊆ P(Y ), since if
X ∈ X , Y \ X ∈ X and thus X ∩ (Y \ X) ∈ X . Thus every Boolean algebra has a bottom
element—an element below every other element. This makes Boolean algebras unsuitable
models of mereology.
DEFINITION 5.2 A quasi-Boolean algebra is a Boolean algebra in which the bottom
element has been removed, and the order is restricted to the remaining elements.
B is a complete quasi-Boolean algebra if and only if B is a quasi-Boolean algebra and
every nonempty subset of B has a supremum in B.
The definition of a complete quasi-Boolean algebra is much like that of a complete
Boolean algebra except that, since we do not have a bottom element, the empty set has
no supremum. It is well-known that second-order classical extensional mereology is sound
and complete with respect to the class of complete quasi-Boolean algebras, and that further-
more every full second-order model of classical mereology is a complete quasi-Boolean
algebra.26
In order to characterize non-wellfounded mereology, we need a class of models that
play a role analogous to that of complete quasi-Boolean algebras for classical extensional
mereology. The first thing to account for is that non-wellfounded mereology takes proper
parthood as a primitive. Unlike in the classical case, proper and improper parthood are not
interdefinable. In particular, one can have several distinct proper parthood relations that
give rise to the same improper parthood relation. Let us make this precise:
DEFINITION 5.3 For any relation R over domain D (i.e., for any R ⊆ D×D) the reflexive
closure of R in D is R ∪ {〈x, x〉 | x ∈ D}.
26 The point is originally due to Tarski (1956). See also Niebergall (2009).
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Let S be a reflexive relation over the domain D. Then we say that R is a proper parthood
relation for S in D if and only if S is the reflexive closure of R in D.
Given any reflexive relation S on D (an improper parthood relation), there will always
be a largest proper parthood relation for S in D (namely, S itself), and a smallest (namely,
S \ {〈x, x〉 | x ∈ D}). The former case corresponds to a scenario where every element
is a proper part of itself, the latter to a scenario where nothing is a proper part of itself.
However, the latter relation is not always transitive when S is. In what follows, we restrict
our attention to transitive proper parthood relations for a given improper parthood relation
in a domain.
We suggest the following class of ‘non-wellfounded algebras’.
DEFINITION 5.4 A non-wellfounded algebra is a quintuple 〈A, B,≤,¡, ′〉 where
• A is a complete quasi-Boolean algebra with order ≤
• A ⊆ B
• ′ : B → A where a′ = a for every a ∈ A
• ¡ is a transitive proper parthood relation for the relation {〈x, y〉 ∈ B×B | x ′ ≤ y′}
in B.
Intuitively, A ⊆ B is the wellfounded part of the universe. The wellfounded part will
always be a complete quasi-Boolean algebra, so that whenever A = B and x ¡ y iff
x ′ < y′ we have classical mereology. That is, non-wellfounded algebras generalize the
classical models in a straightforward way.
THEOREM 5.5. Second-order non-wellfounded mereology is sound with respect to
non-wellfounded algebras.
Proof. Let 〈A, B,≤,¡, ′〉 be a non-wellfounded algebra. Define x 4 y := x ¡ y∨ x =
y. Now, let x 5 y mean that there is some element z in B with z 4 x and z 4 y, and write
x ◦ y to mean that x, y ∈ A and for some z ∈ A, z ≤ x and z ≤ y. It is easy to verify (a)
that for any x, y ∈ B, x ′ ≤ y′ iff x 4 y and (b) that for any x, y ∈ B, x ′ ◦ y′ if and only if
x 5 y. For (a) note that for every x, y ∈ B, x ′ ≤ y′ iff either x ¡ y or x = y since ¡ is a
proper parthood relation for x ′ ≤ y′ in B. For (b) note that if x ′ ◦ y′ then for some z ∈ A,
z ≤ x ′ and z ≤ y′, and thus, since z = z′, for some z ∈ B z 4 x and z 4 y by (a), so
x 5 y. Conversely, if x 5 y, then for some w ∈ B, w 4 x and w 4 y, and thus for some
w ∈ B (by (a) again), w′ ≤ x ′ and w′ ≤ y′. Finally, note that w′ ∈ A, so there is some
z ∈ A (namely w′) with z ≤ x ′ and z ≤ y′, and since x ′, y′ are automatically in A, x ′ ◦ y′.
We can then proceed to show that 〈A, B,≤,¡, ′〉 models non-wellfounded mereology.
(1) NWA1: we have it that ¡ is transitive by definition.
(2) NWS4: Suppose that y %4 x , so that y′ %≤ x ′ by (a). Since A is a complete quasi-
Boolean algebra there is some z ∈ A with ¬z ◦ x ′ and z ≤ y′. Since z′ = z we have ¬z′ ◦ x ′
and z′ ≤ y′ and thus ¬z 5 x and z 4 y.
(3) SO-NWE1: We shall show that for any nonempty subset X ⊆ B there is an element
x of B such that for any y ∈ B, x 5 y if and only if y 5 z for some z ∈ X .
Let X ′ := {x ′ | x ∈ X}. Since A is a complete quasi-Boolean algebra, and ∅ %= X ′ ⊆ A,
there is some x ∈ A such that the following holds for every y ∈ A.
(*) x ◦ y if and only if there is some z ∈ X ′ with y ◦ z.
Note that since x ∈ A, x ′ = x . We shall show that x is the required fusion. Let y ∈ B
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(⇒): Suppose that x 5 y. So x ′ ◦ y′, and since x = x ′, x ◦ y′. By (*) it follows that there
is some w ∈ X ′ such that y′ ◦w. Since w ∈ X ′, there is some z ∈ X with w = z′. So there
is some z ∈ X such that y′ ◦ z′, that is, y 5 z as required.
(⇐): Suppose y 5 z for some z ∈ X . Then z′ ∈ X ′ so by (*) y′ ◦ x ′—that is, y 5 x .
!
THEOREM 5.6. Second-order non-wellfounded mereology is complete with respect to
non-wellfounded algebras.
Proof. Suppose that # is a consistent set containing NWA1, NWS4, and SO-NWE1.27
Then # has a standard second-order model, 〈D, R〉, with domain D and with proper
parthood interpreted by R. It will be sufficient to show 〈D, R〉 is equivalent to a non-
wellfounded algebra, so that # is satisfied in some non-wellfounded algebra. Let S be the
reflexive closure of (R ∩ R−1) in D, and let A∗ := D/S = {[x]S | x ∈ D}, the set of
equivalence classes of D under S. A∗ is a complete quasi-Boolean algebra under the order:
E ≤∗ F iff E = F or, for some x and y, with Rxy, x ∈ E and y ∈ F .28 Using the axiom
of choice there is a function f : A∗ → D with f (E) ∈ E for each E ∈ A∗. Let A be the
range of f . A inherits the structure of a complete quasi-Boolean algebra from A∗ via f .
Let ≤ denote this ordering on A, that is, let f (E) ≤ f (F) iff E ≤∗ F . For each x ∈ D let
x ′ = f ([x]S). We claim that 〈A, D,≤, R, ′〉 is a non-wellfounded algebra.
To complete the proof we must only show that R is a transitive proper parthood relation
for the relation x ′ ≤ y′ in D. That is, we must show that x ′ ≤ y′ if and only if Rxy or
x = y for each x, y ∈ D.
(⇐). If a = b, then a′ = b′ so clearly a′ ≤ b′. Suppose that Rab. So [a]S ≤∗ [b]S , and
thus a′ ≤ b′.
(⇒). Suppose a′ ≤ b′. This means that f ([a]S) ≤ f ([b]S) so that [a]S ≤∗ [b]S . So
either [a]S = [b]S , in which case Rab or a = b, or there is an x and y with x ∈ [a]S , Rxy
and y ∈ [b]S . In the latter case we have (1) either a = x or Rax ; (2) Rxy; and (3) either
y = b or Ryb. In each of these situations we get Rab by transitivity.
!
Although non-wellfounded algebras are versatile enough to capture every possible non-
wellfounded scenario consistent with the axioms of non-wellfounded mereology, one might
wonder what heuristic value they have. Intuitively we may think of A as underlying the
wellfounded part of the universe. The mereological structure of the whole universe is in-
herited from the structure of A through their projections into A, as determined by the ′ func-
tion. To allow mutual parthood between distinct elements, a and b, we consider a to be a
part of b if their projections into A are below each other. Distinct elements in B may be pro-
jected to the same element of A allowing for mutual parthood between distinct elements.
Example. To see how these models might be useful let us apply this idea to the prob-
lem of persistence described in Geach’s TIBBLES THE CAT. Sider (2003) introduces a
27
‘Consistent’ here means consistent in second-order logic under the semantic consequence
relation.
28 By the equivalences in §3.2 it can be seen that 〈D, R〉 models NWS5 and SO-NWE3, a second-
order version of NWE3. By an argument in Cotnoir (2010) it can be shown that under these
assumptions D/S with the order ≤∗ also models versions of NWS5 and SO-NWE3 in which
improper parthood is taken as primitive. Since D/S with the order ≤∗ is a partial order by
construction, it follows that it is second-order model of classical mereology, and is therefore a
complete quasi-Boolean algebra.
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notion of ‘parthood-at-t’ that is supposed to be neutral vocabulary which both perdurantists
and endurantists about persistence could accept. In perdurantist vocabulary, Sider defines
parthood-at-t as follows
x is a part of y at t iff x’s instantaneous temporal part at t is a part of y’s instantaneous
part at t .
Sider’s parthood-at-t relation is a non-wellfounded parthood relation. For example, if t
is some time after Tibbles’ amptutation, Tibbles’ and Tib’s instantaneous temporal part
at t are identical; thus Tibbles and Tib are distinct but mutual parts-at-t . Indeed, non-
wellfounded mereology is the natural logic of parthood-at-t . This follows from the fact
that the parthood-at-t model of parthood gives rise to a non-wellfounded algebra: the
instantaneous temporal part of x at t is just x’s projection into the lattice of subregions
of t .29,30
§6. Conclusion. We have given a systematic overview of the prospects for
non-wellfounded mereology. Two equivalent axiomatizations for non-wellfounded mere-
ology have resulted from careful attention to the kinds of models they accept and reject.
The relation between non-wellfounded mereology and classical mereology turned out to be
surprisingly intimate. We have given a class of models which are sound and complete with
respect to the (second-order) axiomatizations for non-wellfounded mereology. It might
prove useful to put to use for the applications laid out in §1. Perhaps, there are even more
phenomena that might be better explained using a non-wellfounded formal metaphysics.
But this remains to be seen.
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